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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NO MORE BANANAS IN THE OKLAHOMA
SPLIT: EXEMPTING ERISA-QUALIFIED




Section 522 of the United States Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor in
bankruptcy to exempt from the estate certain property.' However, the
state in which the debtor resides may choose to opt out of this scheme by
providing the debtor with legislatively mandated exemptions.2 Debtors
residing in opt-out states cannot take advantage of section 522's exemp-
tions, but must use the exemptions provided under state law.
States, such as Oklahoma, that opt out of the Bankruptcy Code's
scheme of federal exemptions3 leave debtors in the possible position of
having their Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
qualified4 pension plan interests disencumbered from any restrictions on
their transferability. The United States Supreme Court decision of
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc.,' exemplifies this
1. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
2. Id. See also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 823, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWs 5787, 5868; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6322-24.
3. States which opt out do not apply the scheme afforded in the Bankruptcy Code. Instead,
such states provide their own exemption statutes. The opt-out provision in Oklahoma states: "No
natural person residing in this state may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy
proceeding the property specified in subsection (d) of Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 ...... OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(B) (1981 & Supp. 1988).
4. Employee benefit plans are of two types: (1) welfare benefit plans that provide health, legal,
vacation, or training benefits, and (2) pension benefit plans that provide retirement income. Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) & (2) (1988) [hereinafter
ERISA].
5. 486 U.S. 825 (1988). Although Mackey dealt with a welfare benefit plan, it affects debtors
possessing pension benefit plans.
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point. This decision, which has greatly affected debtors in opt-out juris-
dictions, went one step further in demonstrating that pension plan inter-
ests are not protected either under the Bankruptcy Code or other federal
law. The result is unseemly and outrageous-debtors in bankruptcy
should be afforded some type of protection for these interests. Despite
Mackey, debtors in opt-out jurisdictions still are afforded protection
under other federal laws. Therefore, although a debtor cannot use state
exemptions in light of Mackey, the debtor can seek protection under
other federal exemptions not included in the Bankruptcy Code.
The majority of the courts, however, have held ERISA-qualified
plans to be not exempt under other federal law.6 Although the
Oklahoma bankruptcy courts are split on the issue,7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has yet to face the matter.8 If this
issue were to reach the Tenth Circuit, the court should follow the reason-
ing of Kansas9 and some Texas courts1" by allowing debtors in opt-out
jurisdictions to seek protection of their pension plans under other federal
exemptions than those in the Bankruptcy Code.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
A. What the Estate Contains
To understand Mackey and its possible effects on debtors in opt-out
jurisdictions, it is important to determine what the bankruptcy estate
6. See, eg., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d
1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir.
1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Gofi), 706 F.2d 574, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1983). These opinions are referred
to as the majority viewpoint.
7. See In re Brown, 95 Bankr. 216, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989) (plans are not exempt under
other federal law); In re Weeks, 106 Bankr. 257, 262-63 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (although the
court found the plans not to be exempt property, the debtor's argument was based on a state's rights
theory that the Oklahoma exemption statute be given the same effect as federal law and not be
preempted); In re Goldberg, 59 Bankr. 201, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) (plans are not exempt
under other federal law; however, this case was decided before Mackey). But see In re Burns, 108
Bankr. 308, 315 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (en banc) (plans are exempt under other federal law).
8. See FDIC v. Farha, No. 87-1530, slip op. (10th Cir. June 13, 1989), withdrawn, Order and
Judgment (filed Oct. 10, 1989). In Farha, the Tenth Circuit held ERISA-qualified plans could not be
garnished by judgment creditors. Although the court withdrew its first opinion because the plan in
question was not ERISA-qualified, the court still found for Mr. Farha and stated any retirement
pension or profit sharing plan that qualified for a federal tax exemption would be exempt from
creditors if it contained a spendthrift provision. The court based this new decision on OKLA. STAT.
tit. 60, §§ 326-328 (1981).
9. See, eg., In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 235 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
10. See, eg., In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). But cf. In re Volpe,
100 Bankr. 840, 841 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (holding ERISA did not preempt Texas statute creat-
ing exemption for ERISA-qualified plans).
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contains. Under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy
estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case."11 The scope of this broad statute
is intended to include all types of property, tangible or intangible, and to
include property of the debtor needed for a fresh start.12 The issues
raised are whether benefit plans that qualify under ERISA are included
in the bankruptcy estate, and, if so, whether they are then exempt. 3
B. Exemptions from the Estate
1. Generally
Exempt property is property that initially enters the bankruptcy es-
tate, but is later excluded. 4 A debtor lists this property on schedules,
but claims the property as exempt. Being exempt property, it is re-
stricted from the Trustee in Bankruptcy. Section 522(d) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code lists exemptions.15 However, when state law where the
11. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
12. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 823, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs 5787, 5868; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6322-24.
13. Although there has been a debate about whether such plans are excluded from the bank-
ruptcy estate, this Comment focuses on whether they are exempt in light of the Mackey decision.
14. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 823, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5868; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6322-24.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988) states, in pertinent part:
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public
assistance benefit;
(B) a veterans' benefit;
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
(D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of ser-
vice, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an
insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under
such plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), 408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.
401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
3
Grabel: No More Bananas in the Oklahoma Split: Exempting ERISA-Qualified
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:799
debtor resides specifically does not authorize the exemptions in subsec-
tion (d), section 522(b)(1)"6 allows the debtor to then follow the state
exemptions provided by its domicile or exemptions under other federal
laws than those in subsection (d).1 7
2. Exemption Scheme in Oklahoma
Oklahoma does not allow the debtor to choose the federal exemp-
tions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), and has therefore "opted out." Instead,
Oklahoma has its own exemption statutes that must be followed by the
Oklahoma debtor. Under title 31, section 1(A) of the Oklahoma Stat-
utes, the property listed "shall be reserved to every person residing in the
state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of
forced sale for the payment of debts .. . ."I' Subsection (A)(20) of the
statute specifically applies to ERISA benefit plans by referring to them as
retirement plans under "present or future Acts of Congress." There-
fore, the statute clearly states that such plans are exempt from attach-
ment or execution, allowing them to be protected from the Trustee in
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A) (Supp. 1989).
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(20) (Supp. 1989) provides:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsection B of this
section, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state,
exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the
payment of debts, except as herein provided:
(20) "Subject to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Section 112 et seq. of Title 24 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, any interest in a retirement plan or arrangement qualified for tax
exemption purposes under present or future Acts of Congress; provided, such interest
shall be exempt only to the extent that contributions by or on behalf of a participant
were not subject to federal income taxation to such participant at the time of such
contributions, plus earnings and other additions thereon; provided further, any trans-
fer or rollover contributions between retirement plans or arrangements which avoids
current federal income taxation shall not be deemed a transfer which is fraudulent as
to a creditor under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 'Retirement plan or ar-
rangement qualified for tax exemption purposes' shall include without limitation,
trusts, custodial accounts, insurance, annuity contracts and other properties and
rights constituting a part thereof. By way of example and not by limitation, retire-
ment plans or arrangements qualified for tax exemption purposes permitted under
present Acts of Congress include defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans
as defined under the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), individual retirement accounts,
individual retirement annuities, simplified employee pension plans, Keogh plans,
IRC Section 403(a) annuities, IRC Section 403(b) annuities, and eligible state de-
ferred compensation plans governed under IRC Section 457. This provision shall be
in addition to and not a limitation of any other provision of the Oklahoma Statutes
which grants an exemption from attachment or execution and every other species of
forced sale for the payment of debts. This provision shall be effective for retirement
plans and arrangements in existence on, or created after the effective date of this act
4
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Bankruptcy. Because of this decision to opt out, debtors in Oklahoma
may be greatly affected by the Mackey decision.
III. MACKEY v. LANIER COLLECTIONS AGENCY & SERVIC, INC
A. Statement of the Case
The petitioners in Mackey were trustees of an employee welfare ben-
efit plan that provided vacation and holiday benefits to eligible employ-
ees.2 0 The respondent was a collection agency which sought and
obtained money judgments from the plan participants who owed money
to the respondent's clients.2" To collect the judgments, the respondent
brought an action in a Georgia trial court to garnish the plan benefits. 2
Although the trial court allowed the garnishment, the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed, holding a Georgia statute restricted the garnishment of
such plans or programs subject to ERISA, thereby exempting them.23
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and held that although the
Georgia statute exempted the plan from garnishment, the statute was
preempted by ERISA, which purported to regulate garnishment of ER-
ISA funds and benefits. 24 The court further reasoned, through the analy-
sis of the ERISA preemption provision, that Congress had not barred the
garnishment of welfare benefits, although pension benefits were pro-
tected.25 Because there existed a conflict between the statutes, the federal
statute overrode the state statute, and the plan was subject to
garnishment.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the
conflicting decisions among the courts on the question presented in the
case.27 The issue before the Court was whether, and to what extent, the
Id. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 326-328 (1981).
20. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 827 (1988).
21. Id.





27. Id. Because the Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court were in conflict,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 467, 343 S.E. 2d 492 (1986), the court relied on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
463 U.S. 85 (1983), which stated the state law involved would be preempted by ERISA only if the
state law prohibited lawful practices under federal law. Mackey, 178 Ga. App. at 469, 343 S.E.2d at
494. Because the Georgia statute did not prohibit practices lawful under federal law, the court
reasoned that the statute would not be preempted by ERISA. On appeal, however, the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed, Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. v. Mackey, 256 Ga. 499, 350
S.E.2d 439 (1986), and stated that the court of appeals' reliance on Shaw was incorrect. The court
1990]
5
Grabel: No More Bananas in the Oklahoma Split: Exempting ERISA-Qualified
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Georgia statutes controlling restrictions on garnishment of ERISA em-
ployee benefit plans were preempted by the federal statute that governs
the plans. 28
The Court first addressed whether the Georgia statute referred to an
ERISA employee benefit plan. If so, section 514(a) of ERISA would
preempt "'any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan' covered by the statute. '29 The Court
relied on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,30 which held that a law relates to
an employee benefit plan so long as it has a connection or refers to such a
plan.3" The court held that because the Georgia statute at issue in the
case expressly referred to ERISA employee benefit plans, section 514(a)
of ERISA would apply, thus preempting the state statute.32 If the state
law was consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements, the preemp-
tion of section 514(a) would still displace the state law.33 Further, if a
legislature enacts the state law to help effectuate ERISA's underlying
purposes, the state law still will not be saved because of the broad scope
of section 514(a).34
B. The Effect of Mackey on Debtors in Bankruptcy in Oklahoma
After Mackey, it is important to determine the implications for debt-
ors in Oklahoma. Oklahoma opts out of the exemption scheme afforded
in the Bankruptcy Code by providing its own exemptions.3 5 Therefore,
by applying the rationale of the Supreme Court in Mackey, one must
determine if Oklahoma's exemption statutes "refer to" ERISA plan ben-
efits and thus are preempted.
Since Mackey, few cases have been decided on this issue in the
Oklahoma bankruptcy courts. In one decision, In re Brown,36 the court
stated that the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in Shaw "referred to the interplay of state
and federal enforcement of Title VII," which was not relevant to Mackey. Further, if it were rele-
vant, the Georgia statute was prohibiting a lawful federal practice: garnishment of vacation funds.
Therefore, the Georgia statute was preempted by ERISA. Lanier, 256 Ga. at 501-02 n.5, 350 SE.2d
at 442 n.5.
28. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
29. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
30. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
31. Id. at 96-97. See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
32. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829-30.
33. Id. (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739).
34. Id. at 830.
35. See supra note 19.
36. 95 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989). See also In re Burns, 108 Bankr. 308, 311 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1989) (en bane); In re Weeks, 106 Bankr. 257, 262 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989).
[Vol. 25:799
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stated that the Oklahoma exemption statute in title 31, section l(A)(20)
of the Oklahoma Statutes "relates to and has connection with types of
pension plans that are ERISA qualified plans."137 Therefore, this statute
would be preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA, as was the state statute
in Mackey, and the plans would not be exempt under the Oklahoma
statute.38
However, the concern in Mackey was with ERISA-qualified welfare
benefit plans, not pension plans as in In re Brown.39 Nevertheless, the
court stated that the language in Mackey "is so broad and the intent so
clear that it is apparent that the rule laid down applies to ERISA quali-
fied pension benefit plans as well."'  Further, the court stated "§ 514(a)
of the ERISA code applies to any employee benefit plan whether pension
benefits or welfare benefits."4
Because of the Mackey decision, it appears if states opt out of the
exemption scheme provided in the Bankruptcy Code, those state exemp-
tions referring to ERISA-qualified employee benefit plans will be pre-
empted by section 514(a), and thus, the plans will not be exempt in
bankruptcy. If states cannot make a debtor's interest in these plans ex-
empt, Congress must do so.
IV. NONBANKRUPTCY CODE FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS
Although Mackey stated that section 514(a) of ERISA preempts
state exemption statutes referring to ERISA-qualified employee benefit
plans, the debtor is able to choose federal exemptions other than those
found in section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.4 2 Debtors argue that
ERISA is one of those other federal exemptions.43 The majority of the
courts in opt-out jurisdictions hold that ERISA is not included in the
37. Brown, 95 Bankr. at 218 (emphasis in original). The court also dealt with the exemption
statutes in Title 60 and stated that they also refer to and are connected with ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plans. Id. at 218-19.
38. Id. at 218.
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. Brown, 95 Bankr. at 218 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. (emphasis in original).
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
43. See, eg., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th
Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750
F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985) (although the debtor claimed his plans were excluded property
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), the court nevertheless addressed the issue of whether the plans were
exempt under "other federal law"); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th
Cir. 1984) (although the debtors did not attempt to claim their plans exempt under "other federal
law," the court nevertheless addressed the issue).
1990]
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other federal exemptions.'
A. The Argument Made by Debtors
For a plan to be qualified under ERISA, it must meet the require-
ments set out in certain statutes. For example, ERISA requires that the
pension plan contain a provision stating "benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated."4 In addition, for such a plan to
be qualified for tax exempt status, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
states it must contain the same provisions of anti-alienation and assign-
ment.46 Thus, debtors argue that the anti-alienation provisions of ER-
ISA and the IRC create federal nonbankruptcy exemptions for ERISA-
qualified plans under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
B. The Majority Viewpoint
The majority of courts that have decided whether debtors can claim
employee benefit plans exempt under other federal exemptions have ana-
lyzed the legislative history of section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code.47
The House and Senate Reports, in explaining what "other federal law"
is, list property which may be exempted under federal laws other than
the Bankruptcy Code as follows:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104;
Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. 407;
Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42
U.S.C. 1717;
Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601;
Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265;
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death disa-
bility benefits, 33 U.S.C. 916;
Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L);
Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E);
Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor,
38 U.S.C. 3101; and
Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the
patent, 43 U.S.C. 175.48
44. See supra note 6.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988).
47. See, e.g., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360-61, (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750
F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (8th
Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582-86 (5th Cir. 1983).
48. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
[Vol. 25:799
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The majority reasoned that because ERISA was not included in this
list, there is no exemption of these plans under other federal law in sec-
tion 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.49 For example, in Samore v.
Graham (In re Graham),50 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that although the list was not meant to be exclusive,
the failure of Congress to include ERISA plan benefits proved that Con-
gress intended ERISA would not be a "federal law" upon which a sec-
tion 522(b)(2)(A) exemption could be founded."1  The court further
reasoned that although the provisions in the statutes on the list creating a
federal exemption are similar to the anti-alienation provisions in ERISA,
there still exists a distinction between the statutes. This distinction is
that the items on the list are federal in nature, created by federal law or
related to industries usually protected by federal government, while
ERISA regulates "private employer pension systems." 2
Further, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust
(In re Lichstrahl)3 that because ERISA was already referred to in the
exemptions provided in section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
intended to leave ERISA out of section 522(b). 54 Therefore, the Fifth,"s
Eighth,56 Ninth,57 and Eleventh 58 Circuits have generally concluded the
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA and the IRC do not create federal
nonbankruptcy exemptions for ERISA-qualified plans under section
522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
C. The Minority Viewpoint
Courts following the minority view use the same process as the ma-
jority: analyzing the legislative history of section 522 of the Bankruptcy
NEws 5787, 5861; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6316.
49. See, e-g., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstratl), 750 F.2d
1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir.
1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 1274.
52. Id. See also Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th
Cir. 1985); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
53. 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985).
54. Id. (citing Goff, 706 F.2d at 585). See also In re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984); In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
55. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
56. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
57. Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
58. Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
1990]
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Code. However, they have reached the opposite conclusion. In the deci-
sion of In re Hinshaw,59 the debtors argued that 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)
and 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a)(13) constitute a federal exemption as referred to
in section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.' Because these statutes
specify that the plans must contain anti-alienation provisions, the stat-
utes constitute federal exemptions other than those provided in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 61 The debtors' plans in question contained anti-alienation
clauses complying with these statutes.62
The court then reviewed the "list"'63 contained in the legislative his-
tory of what may constitute federal exemptions other than those in the
Bankruptcy Code. 4 Many of the statutes in this list that give rise to a
federal exemption could "be characterized as nothing more than prohibi-
tions against assignment or alienation. ' 6 Therefore, the statutes on the
"list" are similar to the anti-alienation provisions of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13). Although ERISA plans are not
specifically mentioned in this list, the court stated that the similarity be-
tween ERISA and those on the list supports the conclusion that a federal
exemption for ERISA plans was intended.66
The court in Hinshaw relied on Commercial Mortgage Insurance,
Inc. v. Citizens National Bank of Dallas.67 In Commercial Mortgage, the
issue was whether 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)
constituted a bar to garnishment of pension fund benefits.68 The court
recognized that the legislative intent was to ensure that benefits would be
available for retirement purposes; consequently, a creditor's ability to
garnish the plans would defeat the intended protection.69 Although
Commercial Mortgage did not address the nature of a federal exemption
in bankruptcy, the court in Hinshaw stated that its reasoning had close
relevance, and concluded that a federal exemption for an ERISA-quali-
fled plan could be claimed under section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
59. 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
60. Id. at 234.
61. Id. at 234-35.
62. Id at 235.
63. See supra text accompanying note 48.
64. Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. at 235.
65. Id. For example, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (repealed 1980) pro-
vided: "None of the moneys mentioned in this title shall be assignable either in law or equity, or be
subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process ... Id (citations
omitted).
66. Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. at 235.
67. 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
68. Id. at 512.
69. Id. at 518.
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This same position was followed by a Texas Bankruptcy Court in In
re Komet.71 The court disagreed with the majority viewpoint exemplified
in the Fifth Circuit case of Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff),"z which did not
permit an exemption of ERISA plans under section 522(b)(2)(A)7 3
Describing the conclusions in Goff as "strong dicta," the Komet court
supported its decision with a well-reasoned explanation 7'
First, the Komet court disagreed with Goff because the Goff court
mistakenly believed the function of the anti-alienation language was to
qualify the plans for favorable tax treatment.7 5 Although the anti-aliena-
tion language is a condition for tax qualification, the court reasoned that
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) required the language to be included in any plan,
whether or not it is tax qualified.
6
Second, the Komet court stated that the Goff court misunderstood
the structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.77 The court reasoned
that Congress intended the overall structure of section 522(b) to favor
generally the retention of retirement benefits by debtors.7" Further, the
legislative history shows little intent to penalize debtors for choosing one
exemption scheme over another.7 9 In other words, if a state opts out of
the scheme provided in the Bankruptcy Code, debtors in such jurisdic-
tions should not be penalized and should be able to claim their plans as
exempt under other federal law.
Third, the Komet court examined Goff's conclusions concerning the
illustrative "list" of other federal exemptions.80 The court stated that the
Goff court was incorrect when it relied heavily on the list in the legisla-
tive history to support its conclusion that Congress did not intend ER-
ISA to be "other federal law."18 1 Therefore, when a statute is clear on its
face, as is section 522(b)(2)(A), it is against the rules of construction to
resort to its legislative history.82 The Komet court concluded, as did the
70. Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. at 236.
71. 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
72. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
73. Komet, 104 Bankr. at 808.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 809.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 813.
79. Id.
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court in Hinshaw, that section 522(b)(2)(A) allows a debtor in an opt-out
jurisdiction to claim ERISA pension benefit plans as exempt under
"other federal law."83
D. The Oklahoma Split
Presently, the Oklahoma bankruptcy courts are split on whether a
federal exemption exists under ERISA. In the case of In re Goldberg,84
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma held ERISA-qualified plans not exempt under section
522(b)(2)(A) as "other federal law."8" The court, following the reason-
ing of the majority viewpoint, determined that the intent was not to list
ERISA as an exemption, and that the exemptions on the list were signifi-
cantly distinguishable from ERISA because ERISA regulates private em-
ployer pension systems.86
In another decision in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, the reasoning of the majority viewpoint
was again followed. The court in In re Brown87 simply mentioned the
names of the opinions of the majority viewpoint and stated "[a]ll of these
cases contain a thorough analysis of the issue and this court adopts with-
out further discussion the rationale of these decisions.""8 Thus, the court
concluded that ERISA-qualified plans were not exempt under section
522(b)(2)(A) as "other federal law."89
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma gener-
ally disagrees with the decisions from the Northern District. In In re
Burns,90 the court stated that the analysis of the Texas bankruptcy court
in Komet was correct in its interpretation of section 522(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code and should be followed.9" The court reasoned that be-
cause Congress failed to list ERISA in a non-exclusive list did not mean
that the anti-alienation provisions in ERISA were ineffective;92 to hold so
83. Id. at 816.
84. 59 Bankr. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
85. Id. at 205.
86. Id.
87. 95 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989).
88. Id. at 219.
89. Id.
90. 108 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) The court held an en bane hearing wherein all
three bankruptcy court judges sitting in the Western District of Oklahoma heard the case. The court
stated that "[in the interests of judicial economy, and in order to encourage a uniform approach to
and decision upon such issues, the judges of this district, in the exercise of the inherent power of
courts to control their dockets, determined that the issue should be heard en bane." Id. at 309.
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would contravene ERISA's principal purpose.9 3 Because of this, the
court held ERISA plans exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A) as property
exempt under federal law other than section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code.9
4
V. ANALYSIS OF THE VIEWPOINTS
Although the majority viewpoint is from Circuit Courts of Appeals,
the reasoning used to reach the conclusion that a federal exemption does
not exist in ERISA is not well-supported and should not be followed by
the Tenth Circuit. Not only were the opinions not well-supported, 95 they
were decided before the Supreme Court in Mackey stated that ERISA
would preempt any state statute referring to ERISA-qualified benefit
plans. Therefore, the decision in Mackey will have an effect on these
majority circuit opinions concerning opt-out jurisdictions.
The majority focuses on a list set out in the Senate and House Re-
ports that was intended to include other federal exemptions. The major-
ity knew the list was not meant to be exhaustive; but they concluded that
because ERISA plans failed to make the list, Congress intended to leave
them out. The majority fails to recognize the clear meaning of section
522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. This statute states a debtor can
claim as exempt any property exempt under "federal law" other than
section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code; ERISA is other federal law. If
the statute's meaning is clear on its face, there is no need to resort to
legislative history;96 thus, the majority's reliance on the list is unfounded.
However, assuming the legislative history is relied upon, the major-
ity still does not make a persuasive argument. The majority argues that
ERISA was intentionally left off the list; however, it is clear from the
Senate and House Reports the list was not complete. The reports state:
"Some of the items that may be exempted under Federal laws other than
title 11 include .... ,9 Use of the words such as "some" and "may"
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The court in In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) noted that courts
following the dicta of Goffhave done so without providing any significant additional arguments or
support for their conclusion. Ia at 808 n.21.
96. See, eg., Diamond v. Chakrabary, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980); United Air Lines v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977).
97. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs 5787, 5861; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5963, 6316 (emphasis added).
1990]
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show the list is not complete or exact. In American Surety Co. v. Mar-
otta,98 the Supreme Court stated "[iln definitive provisions of statutes
and other writings, 'include' is frequently, if not generally, used as a
word of extension or enlargement rather than as one of limitation or
enumeration." 99 Therefore, ERISA, being a federally created act, is a
part of the list even though it may have been enacted after most of those
included."°
The majority also tried to distinguish ERISA-qualified plans from
the types of plans on the list. The majority argued the provisions in the
statutes on the list may be similar to the anti-alienation provisions in
ERISA. The statutes on the list, however, regulate the federal govern-
ment, while ERISA regulates private employer pension systems.
Although ERISA regulates private employer pension systems, it is a fed-
erally created statute and is nonetheless similar to these statutes on the
list.
The decision in Mackey is another reason why the majority view-
point should not be given consideration by the Tenth Circuit. Opt-out
jurisdictions are no longer allowed to use state exemptions that refer to
ERISA-qualified plans because ERISA preempts them; therefore, debt-
ors in bankruptcy cannot exempt their plans under section 522(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code. If debtors in opt-out jurisdictions are unable to claim
their plans as exempt under other federal law, they are then left in a no-
way-out situation. It does not seem reasonable that debtors in jurisdic-
tions which do not opt out can claim their plans as exempt under section
522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code, and debtors in opt-out jurisdic-
tions cannot under section 522(b)(2)(A). Thus, logic dictates that Con-
gress intended the plans to be exempt because the exemption is provided
for in section 522(d)(10)(E). This effect supports the conclusion that in
opt-out jurisdictions, where a state exemption is preempted by ERISA
because of Mackey, a debtor can still successfully claim an exemption
under other federal law in which ERISA-qualified plans are included.
98. 287 U.S. 513 (1933).
99. Id. at 517.
100. The majority also fails to recognize that two of the statutes on the list have been repealed,
and in the case of two others, the citation given was not the specified provision. The civil service
retirement benefit statute was repealed in 1966 while the foreign service retirement and disability
statute was repealed in 1974. Although both were replaced with similar statutes, they were not
included in the legislative history. The citation given for "[s]pecial pensions to winners of the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor" is to a veterans' benefit statute, including winners of the Congressional
Medal of Honor. The citation given for "veterans benefits" is to a railroad unemployment insurance
statute. Note, Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 83
MICH. L. REv. 214, 223 (1984).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit should follow the minority viewpoint when faced
with the issue of whether debtors may claim their ERISA-qualified plans
as exempt under other federal law in section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Clearly, debtors would suffer a great injustice in opt-out
jurisdictions if they were not able to claim their plans as exempt, while
debtors in other jurisdictions could. Because of Mackey, debtors in opt-
out jurisdictions, such as Oklahoma, should receive the same treatment,
and should be able to claim their plans as exempt under other federal law.
Betsy Grabel
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